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L Introduction
No one, it has often been said, has a constitutional "right"

to practice law.'

Nevertheless, a law license is "some-

thing more than a mere indulgence, revocable at the pleas-

ure of the court, or at the command of the legislature. It is
a right of which he [the lawyer] can only be deprived by
the judgment of the court, for moral or professional delinquency." 2
Even before admission to the Bar, one has certain rights.
And in case of arbitrary or prejudiced action on the part
of the committee on admissions, there seems to be a "case
or controversy" which can be entertained by the courts. 3
3rd Year Law Student Duke University.
In re Gibbs,, 35 Ariz. 346, 278 Pac. 371 (1929) (Right to practice
law is not, like the right to engage in the ordinary business or occupation, a constitutional one.); In re Cox, 164 Kan. 160, 188 P.2d 652
(1948) (emphasizing that the right to practice law is a "privilege"
and that the lawyer is a "quasi-public" official); In re Thatcher, 190
Fed. 969 (N.D.Ohio 1911) (an extraordinary privilege rather than a
property right). Of. In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E.
15 (1910); In re Morse, 98 Vt. 85, 126 Atl. 550 (1924); Hulbert v. Mybeck, 220 Ind. 530 44 N.E. 2d 830 (1942) (practising lawyer is not a
holder of exclusive franchise and, therefore, can not enjoin unauthorIzed practice of law). The "right" to practice law is not privilege or
immunity under Article IV or Amendment XIV. In re Lockwood, 154
U.S. 116, (1894); Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall. (U.S.) 130 (1873).
Cf. Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 11 N.W. 2d 603 (1943) (not
within equal protection clause of Amendment XIV).
2 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 379 (1867).
3 In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945); Application of Kaufman,
206 P.2d 528 (Idaho 1949). In England no one could become a barrister
save with the consent and approval of his Inn of Court, and no reason
had to be given for the Inn's failure to approve. The only remedy was
by appeal to the twelve judges in their capacity as visitors of the Inns
of Court. In re O'Brien's Petition, 79 Conn. 46, 63 At1. 777 (1906) points
out that Connecticut has a similar system, the local Bar taking the
place of the Inns of Court. It was further stated that such a system
of admissions conforms to due process, since it Is suitable and proper
for making sure that an attorney is of good character, and since it Is
sanctioned by established customs. The court can properly Inquire
whether the local Bar made a fair investigation before refusing its
approval to an applicant; but that Investigation can be private. in re
Keenan, 313 Mass. 186, 47 N.E. 2d 13 (1943) states that the judiciary
may adopt any procedure it deems appropriate to review proceedings
relating to membership In the Bar.
*
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The courts, however, will have to consider that the burden
of proving good moral character is always on the applicant,
so that he must demonstrate that his exclusion sprang from
passion, bias or abuse of discretion. 4 Moreover, the decision
to exclude, as well as any judgment of disbarment, will be
upheld although it was not reached with all the formalities
of a civil or criminal trial, since for investigations to determine whether an individual is entitled to practice law,
due process does not require trial by jury, confrontation of
witnesses, or adherence to established rules of evidence. 5
Very few jurisdictions now hold that admissions to the
Bar are completely within the power of either the legislature or judiciary to the exclusion of the other. Generally
there is a combination of the two: the legislature acting
under the police power to set minimum requirements for
the protection of the public, and the judiciary acting under
its "inherent power" to protect the administration of justice
through control of "officers of the court."6 The legislature cannot force issuance of a license to an applicant unless the courts are convinced of his qualifications.7
Some prerequisites for admission are universal, such as
the requirements of age,--usually twenty-one, 5 -residence
within the state in which the applicant intends to practice,
and citizenship or eligibility for naturalization.9 There are
Cf. In re Applicants for License, 191 N.C. 235, 131 S.E. 661 (1926).
Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1883) (disbarment).
Cf. In re
O'Brien's Petition, supra, n. 3 (upholding privacy of investigation of
applicant). It is stated in In re Tracy, 197 Minn. 35, 266 N.W. 88 (1936),
that in passing upon such a question as who shall enjoy the privilege
of practising law, courts must be permitted to determine for themselves what they will or will not consider to be competent evidence.
a In re Tracy, supra, n. 5 (exhaustive citation); Petition of Florida
Bar Association, 134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280 (1938).
7 Application of Kaufman, supra, n. 3, gives an exhaustive citation of
authorities and says that the legislature can not force the court to
admit lawyers without Bar exams if the judiciary thinks such examinations are necessary. But cf. In re Applicants for License, 143 N.C.
1, 55 S.E. 635 (1906).
In re Keenan, 310 Mass. 166, 37 N.E. 2d 516 (1941).
In re Pierce, 189 Wis. 441, 207 N.W. 966 (1926); Agg Large v.
State Bar of Cal., 218 Cal. 334, 23 P.2d 288 (1933); In re Admission to
Bar, 61 Neb. 58, 84 N.W. 611 (1900).
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no longer restrictions as to race 0 or sex.," Few states continue to allow the certificate of graduation from an accredited law school to suffice in fulfilling the educational requirements without any Bar examination;12 some require a
13
period of clerkship.
In determining moral fitness-either in connection with

an application for admission or with a disbarment proceeding-the court particularly inquires as to conduct involving

"moral turpitude." It seems settled that conduct sufficient
to disbar an attorney justifies rejection of an applicant; but
the converse may not be true.14 Convictions of crimes involving intentional wrongdoing' 5 in some states are con-

clusive as to unfit character ;16 in others not. Some conflict
of views also exists as to whether serious traffic violations
30Matter of Taylor, 48 Md. 28, 30 Am. Rep. 451 (1878) (holding
that Maryland's restriction of admissions to whites does not violate
constitutionally protected privileges or immunities of colored applicant).
12In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116, (1894), and Bradwell v. Illinois,
16 Wall.(U.S.) 130, (1873) upheld the constitutionality of excluding
female applicants. In the latter case the concurring opinion indicates
some of the arguments against admitting women to the Bar.
22 Wisconsin and West Virginia do not require such exams.
Of. In re
Admission of Certain Persons to Bar, 211 Wis. 337, 247 N.W. 877 (1933).
FLA. STAT. ANx. § 3903 (1943) exempts from Bar Exam graduates of
certified Florida law-schools.
13Cf. In re Staub, 99 N.J. L. 373, 123 Atl. 541 (1924).
14In re Alschuler, 388 Ill. 492, 58 N.E. 2d 563 (1944); In re Keenan,
supra, n. 8; Bar Assoc. of Boston v. Greenhood, 168 Mass. 169, 46 N.E.
568 (1897); 15 A.B.A.J 780 (1929). But see Opinion of Justices, 279
Mass. 607, 180 N.E. 725 (1932).
25 Crimes like fraud, In re West, 212 N.C. 189, 193 S.E. 134 (1933);
forgery, Spears v. State Bar of Cal., 211 Cal. 183, 294 Pac. 697 (1930);
perjury, In re Ulmer, 208 Fed. 461 (N.D. Ohio 1913); adultery, Grievance Comm. of Hartford Bar v. Broder, 112 Conn. 263, 152 Atl. 292
(1930); extortion, People ex rel. Healy v. McCauley, 230 fI1. 208, 82
N.E. 612 (1907); embezzlement, People v. Mead, 29 Colo. 344, 68 Pac.
241 (1902); keeping a brothel for white and Negro girls, In re Marsh,
42 Utah 186, 129 Pac. 411 (1913); bigamy, U. S. v. Williams, 200 Fed.
538 (2d Cir. 1912).
20 There is no violation of equal protection or due process in making
a conviction conclusive as to disbarment. In re Casebier, 129 Kan. 853,
284 Pac. 611 (1930). But an attorney can be disbarred for an indictable crime of which he has not been convicted. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S.
265 (1883).
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and violations of liquor laws 17 constitute grounds for rejection or disbarment.

Few courts, if any, will hold that ob-

jectionable personal mannerisms, vile language, or fornication are justifiable grounds for disbarment or rejection.' 8
Only one standard of conduct is said to exist for a member of the Bar; he cannot maintain one standard for the
practice of law and another for his private life.1 9 Moreover,
if once a person-either applicant or member of the Barfalls below the proper standard, there is a presumption that
he will remain delinquent; it is a difficult task for such a
person to convince the grievance committee of his present
good character, and that he is willing to conform to the
required standards of the legal profession.

Concealment of charges of crimes involving moral turpitude is one of the most prevalent reasons for rejection of an
applicant or for subsequent disbarment. Whether there
was a conviction, acquittal or nolle prosequi is immaterial;
a board of admissions wishes to make its own inquiry as to
guilt, and concealment is a type of fraud barring such inquiry.20
17 State v. Johnson, 174 N.C. 345, 93 S.E. 847 (1917); State v. Edmunson, 103 Ore. 243, 204 Pac. 619 (1922).
n In re Brown, 389 I. 516, 59 N.E. 2d 855; (1945); in re Washington, 82 Kan. 829, 109 Pac. 700 (1910); In re Mills, 1 Mich. 392 (1850);
In re Elliott, 73 Kan. 157, 84 Pac. 750 (1906); People ex rel. Black v.
Smith, 209 fI1. 241, 124 N.E. 807 (1919) ; In re Holton, 36 R.I. 114, 89 Atl.
242 (1914); In re Turner, 104 Wash. 776, 176 Pac. 332 (1918); Shaeffer
v. State Bar of Cal., 26 Cal. 2d 739, 160 P. 2d 825 (1945); In re Ellis,
359 Mo. 231, 221 S.W. 2d 139 (1949); In re Halpern, 265 App. Div. 240,
38 N.Y.S. 2d 630 (1st Dept. 1942); State v. Farmer, 253 Wis. 232, 33
N.W. 2d 135 (1948) ; In re Isserman, 6 N.J. Misc. 146, 140 Atl. 253 (1928).
Grievance Committee v. Broder, supra, n. 15. Cf. Bradwaj, Moral
Turpitude As the Criterion of Offenses that Justify Disbarment, 24
CAr.. L.REv. 9 (1935); Tucker, The Lawyer as a Business Man, 3 Am. L.
SeOH. REv. 109 (1912); 79 U. OF PA. L. REV. 506 (1931); 5 TEMSPLE L. Q.
649 (1931).
2 In re Patlak, 368 IlM.547, 15 N.E. 2d 309 (1938); In re Phillips, 1V
Cal. 2d 55, 109 P.2d 344 (1941); State v. Rogers, 266 Wis. 39, 275 N.W.
910 (1937) (effect of pardon); State v. Snyder, 136 Fla. 875, 187 So.
381 (1939); In re Rudd, 310 Ky. 630, 221 S.W. 2d 688 (1949); In re
Bozarth, 178 Okla. 427, 63 P.2d 726 (1936); In re Doe, 95 F.2d 386 (2d
Cir. 1938); Ii re Williams, 342 Mo. 542, 122 S.W. 2d 882 (1938).
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H. The Conscientious Objector
In re Summers 21 exemplifies the attitude of the United
States Supreme Court in allowing the states full rein over
the interpretation of requisite moral standards as well as
over admissions to the bar generally. Unless there is a clear
contravention of constitutional rights, the Court will not
intervene.
The Committee on Character and Fitness of the Illinois Bar
held that Summers, an admitted conscientious objector, could
not honestly swear to the oath of office to support the Illinois
Constitution, due to a provision therein for calling all men
of his age into the militia in case of an emergency. For that
reason the Committee refused to issue a certificate that he
was of such moral character as to be allowed admission to
practice law in that state. The decision was upheld by the
Illinois Supreme Court;
The United States Supreme Court, Justice Black dissenting, concluded that Summers had not been denied due
process, and it emphasized that he was not barred because
of his religion but because under the state interpretation
of its constitution he could not take the oath of office in
good faith. 22 The majority relied on United States v.
Schwimmer2 and United States v. Macintosh,24 which interpreted the Federal naturalization laws as denying naturalization to alien conscientious objectors who were unwilling to bear arms. Girouardv. United States25 later overruled these cases on the statutory interpretation point, but
apparently did not affect the validity of the Summers case
as to the constitutional issue. However, it will undoubtedly
influence state courts' interpretations of their states' requirements for admission to the bar, so far as willingness to
serve the country is concerned.
325 U.S. 561 (1945).
For similar result in case involving conscientious objectors who
would not take required military training in land grant colleges, see
Hamilton v. Regents of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
279 U.S. 644 (1929).
24 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
5 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
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Although ready to accept the Girouardapproach and concede that conscientious objectors should not be denied law
licenses, the writer advocates requiring a great amount of
proof that only an applicant'sfaith in religion imposes mental reservations on any oath to serve his state or country.
Otherwise, the Bar might be opening its doors to persons of
the same ilk as some who, during World War II, were propelled into the ministry less by religious beliefs than by
fear of the draft.

M. Communists
The Summers case involves the right to practice law of
an extreme pacifist who is unwilling to bear arms in defense
of the country. At the opposite pole is the Communist who
asks admittance to a Bar which is an integral part of the
institutions he seeks to destroy. No American case seems
to have considered whether adherence to Communism is a
proper ground for excluding an applicant from the practice
of law; however, a Canadian case, In re Martin,2 has passed directly thereon.
Martin, a diligent student of unquestioned morals, had
satisfied all formal requirements for admission to the British Columbia Bar. The Benchers of the Law Society decided
that since he was an admitted Communist or Marxian Socialist, Martin was not fit for membership in the Bar. They
felt that even though Martin was willing to take the required oath of office, he could not do so "without any equivocation, mental evasion or secret reservation;" and indeed,
that for him to take the oath would cast serious doubt on
his intellectual honesty. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
British Columbia refused to set aside the decision of the
Benchers, irrespective of any hardship on the petitioner.
In the United States the conviction of the eleven Communist leaders, 27 if affirmed by the Supreme Court, would
seem to suggest a similar result. If adherence to Communism violates a criminal statute-Section 3 of the Smith
1 D.L.R. 105 (1949); 2 D.L.R. 559 (1949).
U.S. v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (1950).
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Sedition Act 2s--and if that statute is constitutional, it would
seem that the Bar is under no obligation to grant admittance
to one who is violating the law. It would scarcely conduce
to respect for our legal system to have as participants therein persons who are continuing to take part in what has
been adjudicated an illegal conspiracy to overthrow the
government.
Moreover, if a lawyer has been a Communist during the
period that the Smith Act has been in force, his disbarment
might be proper, for guilt of a substantial crime is usually
considered a sufficient showing of bad character to justify
disbarment. On the other hand, such a person might reply
that until the prosecution of the Communist leaders, it was
in no way clear that the Communist Party was violating
the Smith Act. Accordingly, he could argue that something
more than membership in the Party was necessary to show
a state of mind that would imply moral unfitness.
Recently the American Bar Association adopted a resolution proposing that anyone who wished to become or remain a member of the Bar be required to take an oath
"whether he is or ever has been a member or supporter of
any organization that espouses the overthrow by force or
by any illegal or unconstitutional means of the United States
government or the government of any of the States or Territories of the United States." Under the resolution, if the
affidavit reveals membership, the affiant is to be investi29
gated to determine his fitness to be an attorney.
Opposition to this resolution has developed both on policy
grounds and on the ground that it creates constitutional
problems. A constitutional assault on this proposed loyalty
oath would, however, have to reckon with several recent
cases that have sustained the constitutionality of similar
oaths. In Communications Association v. Douds30 the Supreme Court upheld the loyalty oath required of union
officers under the Taft-Hartley Act to the effect that affiant
*8 62 STAT. 808 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A. § 2385 (1951).
"I See 36 A.B.A. J. 922 (Nov. 1950). See also 37 A.B.A. J. 123 (Feb.
1951); 37 A.B.A.J. 320 (April 1951 (Resolution reaffirmed).
339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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was not a member of or "affiliated with" the Communist
Party; indeed, by an equally divided vote, the Court even
upheld that portion of the oath stating that the affiant does
not "believe in" the overthrow of the United States Government "by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional
means." The oath was justified as a proper exercise of the
power over interstate commerce in order to prevent "political strikes."
More recently, in Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of
Elections of Baltimore City,31 the Court upheld the affidavit
required of political candidates under Maryland's Ober Law.
This oath is to the effect that the candidate is not engaged
"in one way or another in the attempt to overthrow the
gbvernment by force or violence," and that he is not knowingly a member of a group engaged in such an attempt. As
construed by the Maryland Court of Appeals, 32 it does not
require any affirmation as to the beliefs of the affiant.
Since the interest of the States in having lawyers who
will uphold the system of administration of justice is scarcely less significant than the interest of the United States in
having interstate commerce free from interruptions by
Communist-fomented strikes, or the interest of the state in
not having its ballots bear the names of Communist candidates, the Bar Association's suggested loyalty oath would
seem to be sustainable. Especially is this so in view of the
Supreme Court's policy-evidenced in the Summers3 3 caseof allowing as much autonomy as possible to the states in
determining who is entitled to practice in their courts.
Moreover, the Douds and the Gerende cases would support
the proposed oath against any argument of vagueness. Apparently under those cases phrases like "supporter of" or
"affiliated with" the Communist Party are not unconstitutionally ambiguous and sufficiently specify the wrong desired to be prevented.
Perhaps the proposed loyalty oath might be assailed as a
bill of attainder within the constitutional prohibition as to
1 19

L.W. 4209 (April 12, 1951).
2 Shub v. Simpson, 76 A.2d 332 (1950).
Supra, n. 21.
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either State or Federal action. Cummings v. Missouri3 4
held it to be a bill of attainder for Missouri to require an
oath from ministers, attorneys, and other types of professional men that they had not supported the Confederacy
during the Civil War. Without such an oath they would
not be allowed to continue in their professions. Cummings,
a Catholic priest, successfully contended that this Missouri
requirement, although directed towards a broad class, was
nevertheless a legislative act inflicting punishment without
judicial trial, the punishment being exclusion from the
specified professions of anyone for whom taking the oath
was an impossibility.
35
Ex parte Garland,
decided the same day, involved a Federal statute requiring a loyalty oath that one had never
supported the Confederacy as a prerequisite for practice
in the Supreme Court. The exclusion from the practice of
law, "or from any of the professions or any of the ordinary
avocations of life for past conduct can be regarded in no
other light than as punishment for such conduct, '36 and,
being a legislative action directed toward an ascertainable
group, was held to be a bill of attainder. The Court, in the
Douds case,3 7 refused to call the loyalty oath provision of
the Taft-Hartley Act a bill of attainder, one distinction being that this oath related only to present beliefs and future
conduct rather than, as in the Garlandand Cummings cases,
to past conduct. Accordingly there was no exclusion from
certain rights by virtue of past conduct 3s-which the Court
seemed to feel was necessary to constitute a bill of attainder.
Since exclusion from the practice of law can be a punishment, the American Bar Association's proposed loyalty
71 U.S. 277 (1867).

71 U.S. 333 (1867).
Id. at p. 377.
Si ra, n. 30.

One of the other leading authorities on bills of attainder is U.S.
v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), which held unconstitutional a congressional attempt to keep Lovett and two other named individuals from
holding government jobs. In the state courts, one of the most recent
decisions on bills of attainder is that of the N.Y. Court of Appeals in
regard to certain provisions of the Feinberg Law. See Thompson v.
Wallin, 95 N.E. 2d 806 (1951).
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oath might be a bill of attainder if it produced such exclusion. However, the oath is couched in such terms as to
be merely a basis for an investigation and does not automatically result in exclusion; therefore, it does not seem
to be punishment for past conduct as such. On the other
hand, in view of the probable attitude of grievance committees that membership in the Communist Party is conclusive as to moral unfitness, and of the strong presumption of a continuance of moral unfitness, it is likely that in
practice the oath would result in disbarment of most attorneys who at any time have been Communists or fellowtravelers.
The Garland case took great pains to emphasize that an
attorney is unlike a civil servant holding an office created
by the legislature, and to some extent it treated the practice of law as an "ordinary avocation." Under such an
approach disbarment of lawyers who were former Communists-and requiring a loyalty oath from applicants for
admission-would seem no more permissible than refusing
to allow Communist plumbers to practice their trade. But
the long emphasis on the right of the courts to limit admission only to persons of moral fitness signifies that in some
respects an attorney is in an entirely different position from
one who is engaged in an "ordinary avocation."3 9 Moreover, the Cummings and Garlandcases were decided during
Reconstruction when the majority of the Supreme Court
was probably desirous of being conciliatory to the vanquished South; accepted at face value the protestations of loyalty
by defeated Confederates; and, in view of that acceptance,
felt that past action of Confederates had no bearing on subsequent moral fitness to practice law. The current judicial
attitude towards Communists, on the other hand, is scarcely
conciliatory, for the courts are justly skeptical of claims
that the Communist Party is not engaged in plotting revolution, and would be prone to assume that past disloyalty is
still operative.
The Cummings and Garland cases also held the statutes
there involved to be invalid as ex post facto laws. As to this
See authorities cited in note 1.
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point, too, the American Bar Association's proposal can be
distinguished on the ground that the oath required is merely
a prelude to investigation of present fitness, and not a punishment for past conduct.
Would the oath infringe the privilege against self-incrimination in that it might require disclosure of conduct which
was a violation of the Smith Act, or which would at least
tend to incriminate under the Smith Act? In view of the long
tradition that an attorney must make full disclosure to
grievance committees and that an applicant can not conceal anything which the Committee on Moral Fitness might
feel to be relevant, the oath would seem to be sustainable.
Certainly it goes no further than requiring a business man
under OPA regulations to keep books which may incriminate him. 40 In both instances it can be cogently argued that
if he wishes to avoid disclosure, the person involved should
go into another business or profession.
IV.

Conclusion

The "right" to practice Law is protected against arbitrary deprivation. However, it depends on high moral
character and legal training. The State Bar is allowed
great autonomy in determining moral fitness, and its determination will be sustained despite an incidental impingement on freedom of religion, speech, belief or political organization. Because of the high standing of lawyers in
the community, the vital nature of the administration of
justice, and the ability of a few dissident lawyers to bring
justice into disrepute, the argument is strong that a state
can require a loyalty oath--even a partially retrospective
oath like that the American Bar Association proposes-to
protect itself from subversion of such an important function. The counter-argument on both constitutional and
policy grounds is that the state can not and should not go
too far in making requirements that might lessen the ability
of the Bar to be independent, and its willingness to handle
unpopular cases.
Cf. Shapiro v. U.S., 335 U.S. 1 (1948).

